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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
EDWARD ALLEN WALKER, : Case No. 20060949-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (2008). This case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. 
The trial court entered a conviction and sentence against Appellant Edward Walker for 
one count of enhanced possession of supplies for a clandestine lab, a first degree felony 
offense under Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(l) and 58-37d-5(l)(d), (e) (Supp. 2004); and 
i 
one count of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony offense under 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2004). The judgment of conviction and 
sentence is attached as Addendum A. (See R. 153-55). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the charges in this case due 
to a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(h) (2003) (concerning the right to trial 
within 30 days of arraignment). 
Standard of Review; This Court will apply a correctness standard to review of the 
issue on appeal. See Salt Lake City v. Roseto* 2002 UT App 66, ^ 7, 44 P.3d 835 
(considering application of Section 77-1-6, and applying a correctness standard); see also 
State v. Mejia, 2007 UT App 337, [^ 8, 172 P.3d 315 (applying a correctness standard to 
an issue concerning the right to a speedy trial); State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 125, 129 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (applying a correctness standard to a "trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to dismiss") (cite omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Walker preserved the issue at R. 79-83; 228:2; and 229:8-13. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum B: Utah R. Crim. P. 10 (2008); Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(h) (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
In January 2005, the State filed an Information against Walker for possession of a 
precursor or laboratory supplies for a clandestine operation, with an enhancement; and 
possession of a controlled substance. (R. 1-3 (charging count one as a first degree felony, 
and count two as a third degree felony)). In March, the trial court held a preliminary 
hearing (R. 24-25), which it had to reschedule because the State failed to provide audio 
recordings in discovery. (See R. 24-25; see also R. 38; 43-44). On April 7, the trial court 
found sufficient cause to bind the case over for trial. (R. 43-44). 
On June 6, 2005, the trial court began a two-day jury trial in the matter. (R. 86-
89). On June 7, 2005, the jury rendered a guilty verdict on both counts as charged. (See 
2 
R. 140-41; 144-45). On August 26, 2005, the trial court sentenced Walker to an 
indeterminate prison term, which may be for life, on count one; and to an indeterminate 
prison term not to exceed five years on count two. (R. 153-55 (stating the terms shall run 
concurrently)). Also, the court allowed defense counsel additional time to file a motion 
i 
for a new trial. (See R. 165 (indicating court "extended the time" for filing new trial 
motion); see also R. 167 (granting additional time for motion); "Motion for New Trial" 
and "Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial,'5 contained in pleadings file). 
On June 8, 2006, Walker filed a notice of appeal. (R. 193-94). On September 25, 
I 
and November 8, 2006, the trial court entered two separate orders on the motion for a 
newtrial. (R. 195-98; 201; 208). 
On April 10, 2007, this Court entered an order reaffirming its jurisdiction over the 
I 
appeal. It stated that "the notice of appeal was timely filed." (Order, dated April 10, 
2007, and attached as Addendum C). Also it ruled that the scope of the appeal would not 
include the district court's "denial of the motion for new trial," because Walker filed the 
notice of appeal before the trial court entered a final order on the motion. (IdL (citing 
Utah R.App. P. 4(b)(2)). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 17, 2004, several officers were involved in conducting surveillance, 
making arrests, and processing information at an apartment in Murray, Utah. (See, e.g. 
R. 229:93-94, 98-99, 113). The apartment belonged to Buffy Webber. (See, R. 229:154). 
I 1 
Detective Cheshire conducted surveillance. He watched for Walker. (See R. 229:95-98; 
see also R. 229:113 (identifying address as 538 West Murray Boulevard, apartment 8S)). 
3 
He testified that he saw a woman leave the apartment complex and go to a car, and 
he saw Walker follow. (R. 229:96; see also R. 230:26 (stating the woman was Catherine 
Austin); 230:25 (describing earlier events where Walker and Buffy Webber left together 
and returned a short time later)). The woman, Catherine Austin, carried small bags and a 
thermos. When she got to the car, she popped the hood and handed the bags to Walker 
and he "stuck them under the hood area of the car." (R. 229:96-97; 229:101, State's 
Exhibits 6, 7, 8; see also R. 229:109). 
At that point, Detective Carman "made contact5' with Walker as he was standing 
beside the car. (R. 229:203, 205, 207). Carman testified that the bags were tucked 
"pretty tightly" in the engine compartment. (R. 229:205). And he stated that "people 
involved in illegal activity will often secret those items in the engine compartment for 
law enforcement efforts." (R. 229:209). 
Carman knew that Walker had an outstanding warrant, so he arrested and searched 
him. (R. 229:203-04; see also 229:98). During the search, Carmen discovered "a syringe 
in [Walker's] right-front pocket." (R. 229:204). He also discovered "iodine crystals, 
some tubing, and some product that looked to be methamphetamine" inside the bags. (Id.) 
Meanwhile, Detectives Stokes and Ward went to the apartment and entered with 
consent. (R. 229:122). Stokes went to the back two bedrooms and noticed the room 
"was filled with a hazy smoke" from the middle of the room to the ceiling. (R. 229:123 
(stating the smoke was thick); 230:14). He claimed that even with ventilation and the 
front door opened, smoke hung in the air. Also, he noticed a chemical smell and a 
woman lying on the floor. (R. 229:123; see also R. 230:26 (identifying the woman in the 
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apartment as Carma Grosbeck)). 
Stokes, Ward and Grosbeck left the apartment, and Stokes and another officer 
returned later after they donned respirators. (R. 229:124). They also checked the air for 
deadly particles and determined it was not harmful. (R. 229:125; see also R. 229:152; 
230:14-15). 
Stokes conducted a search of the apartment. He found boxes and glass items in 
the back bedroom (R. 229:124-25); a container with dark blue crystals near the refrigera-
tor (R. 229:127; State's Exhibits 15 and 16); items in the bathtub (R. 229:128; State's 
Exhibits 17 through 19); flat-bottomed flasks and components in the northeast bedroom 
(R. 229:129-30; State's Exhibits 31 through 35); and equipment, components and 
chemicals in the bathroom, bedroom, and kitchen of the apartment. (R. 229:147). 
Detectives Idle and Ward photographed the scene. Idle found ajar of iodine in the 
kitchen (R. 229:184-85; State's Exhibit 24); miscellaneous chemicals and paraphernalia 
(R. 229:186; State's Exhibit 25); a coffee filter, a cylinder, a coffee pot with red sludge 
and red powder (R. 229:187; State's Exhibit 51); clear liquids, tubing, a pitcher of white 
sludge (R. 229:188; State's Exhibit 26); a dish, a razor blade, a powder substance (R. 
229:189; State's Exhibit 27); and a jug with a label for muriatic acid (R. 229:189-90; 
State's Exhibit 28). Ward photographed a Starbucks bottle with a substance that 
appeared to be iodine crystals (R. 229:197-98; State's Exhibits 15 and 16); and a black 
bag in the bedroom that contained "several bags of what we suspected to be 
pseudoephedrine pills". (R. 229:199; State's Exhibits 38 through 41: see also R. 229:99-
100 (Cheshire remained to assist with processing and cataloging evidence)). 
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Stokes next assisted with "the decontamination of the suspects" and their clothing. 
(R. 229:130-31). And he talked to Walker in his unmarked car while Walker remained in 
handcuffs. (R. 229:132-33 (stating he advised Walker of his rights)). According to 
Stokes, Walker "said that he knew what was going on." (R. 229:134). He said the lab 
items belonged to Buffy Webber and a man named Colorful. (R. 229:134-35). Walker 
denied involvement in the lab, but he saw activities, and he "knew that the production of 
methamphetamine was occurring at the apartment.5' (R. 229:135; but see R. 230:15-16 
(acknowledging that Walker did not say that methamphetamine was being produced or 
cooked in the apartment)). 
Stokes was suspicious that Walker had been "cooking" in the apartment (R. 229: 
136), and he mentioned his suspicions to Walker. (Id.) At that point, according to 
Stokes, Walker "changed his story." (Id.) "He admitted to having assisted in the dis-
mantling of the lab and admitted that his fingerprints would probably be found on some 
of the components of the lab." (R. 229:136, 138; see also R. 229:150, 157). Also, 
according to Stokes, Walker stated that he "was there to assist" Catherine Austin and 
Colorful "in cooking." (R. 229:137; but see R. 230:16 (acknowledging that Walker did 
not say he went to the apartment to assist in cooking methamphetamine)). "Austin had 
the recipe incorrect, and he was there to assist her with that." (R. 229:137; 230:17). 
Stokes was curious as to what Walker had to gain, "[a]nd his response to that was 
that he uses methamphetamine, and he knew if he assisted in cooking the methampheta-
mine, that he would be able to get high as well as get some extra product for his own 
use". (R. 229:139; 230:17). Stokes transported Walker to jail. (R. 229:140). 
6 
Stokes described how methamphetamine is made. It is "derived from a 
combination of three chemicals: iodine, red phosphorous, and pseudoephedrine or 
ephedrine." (R. 229:142). It involves a cooking method for a chemical reaction, "and 
the final result is methamphetamine." (Id.) Stokes described the products, equipment 
and systems used to manufacture methamphetamine. (R. 229:142-44). He believed that 
methamphetamine had been recently produced in the apartment. (R. 230:23). 
A chemist from the Utah State Crime Lab analyzed items retrieved from the scene. 
(See R. 229:169 (stating 25 items were submitted for testing)). He testified that the items 
included iodine (R. 229:171); methamphetamine (R. 229:173-74, 175-76, 177, 178); 
sodium hydroxide (R. 229:174); pseudoephedrine precursor (R. 229:175; Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37c-3(2)(q) (Supp. 2004)); hydrochloric acid (R. 229:176); and phosphorous 
(R. 229:177). 
Walker also testified at trial. He acknowledged a prior conviction and prison term 
for a "[mjeth lab" (see R. 230:33-34 (affirming that he "got caught cooking meth"); 
230:35), and he recited a partial recipe for methamphetamine (R. 230:34). 
He testified that on November 16, he went to Webber's for money and saw people 
"pulling" ephedrine from cold tablets. (R. 230:35-36). He thought "they were going to 
cook some meth." (R. 230:37). While he was there, Austin asked questions about 
"cooking meth," "and [Walker] told her." (R. 230:37). Also, he agreed to loan Webber 
furniture: "her apartment was empty" and "[i]t was a mess." (R. 230:38). He did not go 
into the bedrooms, but he noticed clothes and "stuff scattered everywhere" in the front 
room, so he "helped her clean it up." (Id.) 
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Walker then returned to the apartment the next morning. (R. 230:38). He went 
into the bathroom, front room, and kitchen. (R. 230:39). He noticed a green hose around 
the shower curtain and glass tubing hooked to it. (Id.) He assumed the items were used 
"to make meth." (R. 230:39, 45). He pulled the items from the shower curtain and threw 
them "in a box, and [] told Buffy [Webber] to get rid of it." (R. 230:39). Also, Austin 
asked again "what the weight increments were" for methamphetamine "as far as ' if I had 
this much red and this much white, how much blue do I need?'" (R. 230:40, 51). Walker 
told her again. (R. 230:40). While Walker was there, people were smoking cigarettes 
and methamphetamine. (R. 230:41). 
Walker left the apartment and returned again three times. (R. 230:41). He testified 
that he went to the car with Austin and popped the hood to reconnect a headlight, when 
officers approached with guns drawn and arrested him. (R. 230:42). Walker testified 
that he assumed Webber planned to cook methamphetamine, but he did not see anyone 
cooking in the apartment while he was there. (R. 230:43-44). 
Walker discussed the police interrogation. He testified that he talked to Stokes 
about lab parts, and he said Webber mentioned having equipment for a methamphetamine 
lab. (R. 230:46-47). Walker told Stokes, "I seen what she was doing," and he was 
referring to "pulling of the pills." (R. 230:46-47, 71-72; see also R. 230:72 (stating he 
"thought that they were going to cook meth")). Also, when Stokes asked if Walker 
cooked, he answered, "No, but I did help clean." (R. 230:47-48, 49). Also, he said "I 
helped break it down," meaning he took the hose from the shower in the bathroom, 
placed it in a box and told Webber to get rid of it (R. 230: 50-51, 58); and he cleaned the 
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"front room area and stuff," and wiped the kitchen counter and stove. (R. 230:47-48). 
He saw "'Red Double V that was sitting by the sink. That's all I seen as far as chemicals 
go." (R. 230:48; see also R. 230:56-57). 
Walker told Stokes, "I'm not telling you I didn't have involvement in it," meaning 
he "helped clean up the area and stuff, and plus [he] also told Cat [Austin] the weight 
increments"; he gave her "a few pointers." (R. 230:49, 51). However, he denied placing 
lab items in the car engine and he denied having knowledge as to what was in the bags 
Austin carried to the car; he maintained that he went to the car to fix the headlight. (R. 
230:48-49, 66-67, 68). 
Walker testified he was trying to be helpful to police. (R. 230:50). Also, he lied 
during the interrogation. (R. 230:50, 52-53, 73). When he said he "didn't know what 
was going on in that interview," that was a lie. (R. 230:52-53; see also R. 230:54). 
At the time of Walker's arrest, he had two pocket knives, a wallet, a syringe, and a 
little strobe light in his pocket. (R. 230:59). He had the syringe because he "had 
intravenously used meth before." (R. 230:60). He went to the apartment to smoke or 
"sho[o]t up" meth. (Id.) He did not smoke it the night before, but he smoked a "couple 
of hits" on November 17 in the front room with Austin, Webber and Grosbeck. (R. 230: 
60-61, 65). At the end of trial, the jury found Walker guilty as charged. (R. 230:125-27). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Walker asserted his right to have the trial within 30 days of arraignment as 
provided by Section 77-l-6-(l)(h). Notwithstanding, the court proceeded with a trial 
approximately 60 days after arraignment. Walker maintains that the delays in this case 
9 
violated his right to a speedy trial. In reviewing whether a defendant's right to a speedy 
trial was violated, this Court will balance and assess four factors, including, (1) the length 
of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a 
speedy trial; and (4) whether defendant was prejudiced as a result. The fourth factor for 
prejudice is concerned with oppressive pretrial incarceration; anxiety to and concern by 
the accused due to the delay; and whether the delay has impaired the defense. 
In this case the four-factor test supports that (1) the trial began 60 days after the 
arraignment; (2) pretrial delays were attributable to the prosecutor; (3) Walker and his 
counsel repeatedly requested a speedy resolution and trial; and (4) Walker was prejudiced 
by the delays in the proceedings. Specifically, he was not allowed a parole hearing until 
the court resolved the charges; he was anxious and concerned about the charges as 
reflected in the fact that he made repeated requests for immediate resolution; and his 
defense was impaired. For the reasons set forth herein, Walker respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court ruling and remand the case for dismissal of the charges. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT THE TRIAL WITHIN 30 
DAYS OF ARRAIGNMENT AS REQUESTED BY WALKER. 
Walker claims the trial court erred when it failed to conduct the trial within 30 
days after arraignment. According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6, a defendant is entitled to 
"a trial within 30 days after arraignment if [he is] unable to post bail and if the business 
of the court permits." Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(h). In construing the statute this 
Court has stated the following: 
10 
The rules of statutory construction in Utah are well settled. When interpreting a 
statute, this court looks first to the plain language of the statute. See_ State v. Vigil, 
842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992); see also Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick 
890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) ("[Statutes are generally to be construed 
according to their plain language. Moreover, '[unambiguous language may not be 
interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.'" (second alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)). The reason for such an approach is that "'[w]e must be guided 
by the law as it is . . . . When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held 
to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction."' Frederick 890 
P.2d at 1020 (citation omitted). 
Roseto, 2002 UT App 66, ^ 8. In addition, this Court has stated, 
[S]ection 77-1-6 is directory in nature, not mandatory. Nonetheless, a period of 
time between arrest and trial in excess of the statutory directive may well be a 
"triggering mechanism" for heightened scrutiny of a claim that the right to a 
speedy trial was denied. We therefore proceed to determine whether the delay was 
constitutionally impermissible. 
State v. HoyU 806 P.2d 204, 207-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (internal cites omitted); see 
also State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 708 & n.ll (Utah 1990). 
In State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, this Court recognized that a defendant's argument 
under § 77-l-6(l)(h) implicates "the 'speedy trial' guaranty of the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore, even though defendant does not present constitutional arguments to the court, 
we analyze his claim with reference primarily to Sixth Amendment cases." IcL at 207 
n.2. To that end, this Court has identified four factors to balance and consider in the 
analysis, including, [1] the "[l]ength of [the] delay, [2] the reason for the delay, [3] the 
defendant's assertion of his right, and [4] prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 208 (citing 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)); see also In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 
UT 28, U 26, 1 P.3d 1074 (stating that section 77-l-6(l)(h) accommodates a defendant's 
11 
right to a speedy trial, and identifying four-part test); State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 
1327 (Utah 1986); Snyder, 932 P.2d at 129. 
This Court applied the four-part test recently in State v. Mejia, 2007 UT App 337, 
*|fl[ 9-14. There, the State charged defendant in October 2003 with several offenses. See_ 
ijL at ^ 2, 3. The court scheduled and then continued a preliminary hearing to November 
17, "so that an interpreter could be obtained for Mejia." IdLdX\2. At the November 17 
hearing, the defendant made a discovery request and the State filed an amended informa-
tion causing the court to continue the preliminary hearing again to December 8. IcL After 
that hearing, the court bound the defendant over on all charges, and set the matter for a 
pretrial conference and trial. Id_ at *| 3. The parties then stipulated to continuances for 
the pretrial conference, and when it was finally held, defendant filed a motion for a 
competency evaluation, and the trial court granted that request. See_ id. a t^ |3-4 . 
Thereafter, the court granted continuances for various reasons, which involved an 
interpreter for the defendant, the entity evaluating the defendant, and the defendant's 
request to review medical records, among other things. M at *|J 4. When the evaluation 
was completed in early September 2004 "Mejia was found competent to stand trial but 
waived his right to have his case heard within fifteen days of that date." Id. The trial 
court then scheduled a pretrial conference and trial, and it continued the proceedings 
when defendant failed to respond to discovery requests. Id. at^ f 5. 
Sometime thereafter, the case was assigned to a different judge with the "earliest 
trial calendar opening" for January 2005, which was more than 15 months after the State 
filed the charges. IdL at ^ 2, 6. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation 
12 
of his right to a speedy trial, and the trial court denied the motion. IcL at f 7. After 
conviction, the defendant appealed. See id_ This Court determined that under the four-
part analysis, the defendant's rights were not violated. IcL at ^ 9-15. It ruled that 
defendant was "at fault" in part for delays in the case and he failed to do things in a 
timely manner himself, amounting to "temporary waivers of his right to a speedy trial." 
Id_ at Tf 12. Also, the Court ruled that defendant "did little to assert his right to a speedy 
trial", id at ^ 13, and he was not prejudiced by the delay. hd at \ 14. Thus, it affirmed 
the trial court's ruling on the matter. Id. at f^ 15. 
The circumstances of the Mejia case are distinguishable from this matter. In this 
case, Walker did not post bail; rather, he was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison while 
the proceedings were pending. (See R. 10; 19; 33; 36; 41; 45; 49 (indicating throughout 
proceedings that "defendant" remained in custody at "USP")). Thus, Walker was entitled 
to a trial within 30 days of arraignment. See. Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(h). According 
to the record, Walker asserted his rights under Section 77-l-6(l)(h). (See R. 228:2; 79-
83; 229:8-13). This Court should assess the matter under the four-part analysis as set 
forth in HovU 806 P.2d at 208. 
Under the first factor, this Court will consider the length of the delay. See_ Hayt, 
806 P.2d at 208. This Court has recognized that the United States Supreme Court has 
"rejected rigid time requirements to establish whether the right to a speedy trial has been 
violated." M Nevertheless, the "State and federal speedy trial acts provide some useful 
guidance in [the area of timing], inasmuch as they also contain requirements that cases 
be resolved within specific time-frames. Section 77-1-6(1 )(h) of the Utah Code, for 
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example, requires that a trial begin within thirty days after arraignment if the accused is 
not posting bail, as long as the court's other business presents no obstacle to this." 
Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ]f 26 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the length of delay should be of concern. The time for arraignment 
corresponded with the preliminary hearing. Utah R. Crim. P. 10(a) (2008) (stating a trial 
court shall arraign defendant upon bind-over). The trial court began the preliminary 
hearing on March 17, 2005. (R. 224). It continued the hearing when it was revealed that 
the State failed to provide information requested in discovery and pertinent to the 
defendant. (See R. 224:14-16 (reflecting objection where the State failed to provide 
recordings as part of discovery; also the prosecutor acknowledged that "the prosecution" 
was responsible for the failure); see also R. 224:16, 17, 22-23 (ordering continuance and 
requiring State to provide the recordings)). 
Although the prosecutor advised the trial court that he could deliver the recordings 
to the defense in "[a] day" (see R. 224:16), the prosecutor waited to provide the 
recordings until the next hearing, March 29, 2004 (R. 225), thereby necessitating another 
continuance in the matter. (Id.) When the preliminary hearing was finally concluded on 
April 7, 2005, the trial court bound Walker over on the charges. (See R. 226:13). The 
bind-over proceeding triggered the time for the arraignment. See Utah R. Crim. P. 10(a). 
In this case, the trial began on June 6, sixty days after bind-over proceedings. (See 
R. 43-44 (reflecting bind-over); 86-89 (reflecting trial)). While the length of the delay 
may be "within the range of delays which have passed constitutional muster," HoyU 806 
P.2d at 208 (citing Trafny, 799 P.2d at 708 n.16 (citing various cases with delays of 4 1/2 
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years, 7 months, 12 months, 3 1/2 months and 4 1/2 months)), the delay in this case is of 
concern given the language of Section 77-l-6(l)(h), the State's role in causing the delays 
(see infra, pp. 15-17), and Walker's repeated requests for an immediate resolution. (See, 
e.g., R. 223:2 (requesting earliest possible date); 225:3-4 (reiterating that the defense has 
requested that the matter be dealt with "as quickly as we could" and at the "soonest" 
date); 227:2-3 (court stating it would reset matter "as quickly as possible"; and defendant 
asking for a date "as soon as is possible"); 228:2 (invoking right to have case tried within 
30 days); 79-83). Based on the totality of the circumstances, the length of the delay 
weighs in favor of dismissal where Walker's rights to a speedy trial were violated. 
Under the second factor, this Court will consider the reasons for the delays in the 
proceedings. See_ Hoyt, 806 P.2d at 208. In this case, the prosecutor caused the delays. 
Under the law, that is unacceptable. That is, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he 
30-day statutory period is . . . specifically conditioned upon whether 'the business of the 
court permits' the trial to be set within the 30-day time limit." State v. Parry, 714 P.2d 
1160, 1162 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added); see also Roseto, 2002 UT App 66, % 8 (stating 
when statutory language is "clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses") (cite omitted); HoyU 806 P.2d at 208 (listing several events that contributed 
to delay of trial, including, defendant's motions and request for a polygraph examination, 
the state's unavailability of witnesses, general obligations of witnesses and counsel, and 
"the illness of the trial judge"; and identifying only the "illness of the trial judge" as 
"business of the court" in that scenario). 
Notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, this Court has recognized that 
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counsel's other obligations may necessitate a delay in a trial. See, Hoyt, 806 P.2d at 208. 
Yet in this case, the reasons for the delays are not supportable or legitimate and they are 
not sufficient on this record. At the time of trial, the prosecutor stated that the trial was 
originally scheduled to begin in May 2005, and "[i]t's true that the State was unable to 
proceed on that day. I believe that the Court's familiar with all those reasons. I won't 
put them all on the record, but. . . there was no one here representing the State's interest 
who was ready to proceed on the 16th day of May. A continuance was sought, and I 
believe over the defendant's objection, granted." (R. 229:10-11). 
The court then ruled that the reasons for the delay were "that counsel for the State 
encountered an emergency situation at the last minute with the illness of his mother in a 
different state, necessitating his travel." (R. 229:12). Also, "the indication from the 
prosecution was that no other person had been involved in handling this matter prior to 
that time. It would have been impossible for the State to have a new prosecutor assigned, 
and that was the reason that the Court allowed the continuance, and we set it for this time 
as the earliest possible time available." (R. 229:12). The record in this case fails to 
supportthe trial court's ruling.1 * 
Specifically, since the prosecutor declined to "put [the reasons for the delay] all on 
the record" (R. 229:10-11) and filed nothing with the court, the record fails to contain 
1
 As stated supra, the standard of review for the issue on appeal here is "correctness." 
See Meiia, 2007 UT App 337, \ 8; Roseto, 2002 UT App 66, If 7; Snyder* 932 P.2d at 
125. That is appropriate since the trial court held no evidentiary hearing and received no 
evidence on the motion to dismiss. In addition, the trial court was not required to make 
credibility determinations about witnesses or evidence in connection with ruling on the 
motion. 
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anything about the circumstances: It fails to contain anything about an "emergency 
situation at the last minute" or "illness" or the necessity of travel. (See Record in 
general). In addition, contrary to the trial court's assertion that "no other person [from 
the prosecutor's office] had been involved in handling this matter prior to" the May trial 
date, the record shows that several prosecutors were involved in handling the case. (See 
R. 222 (prosecutor Sandy Johnson); 223 (same); 225 (prosecutor Josh Player); 226 
(prosecutor Kim Cordova); 227 (prosecutor Sean Torriente)). Thus, based on this record, 
the reasons for the delay are insupportable and unjustified, weighing in favor of dismissal 
where Walker's rights to a speedy trial were violated. 
Under the third factor, this Court will consider whether the "defendant objected in 
[a] timely fashion to the delay and asserted his right to a speedy trial." HoyU 806 P.2d at 
208. In this case, defense counsel made repeated requests for immediate scheduling and 
a trial date. (See, e.g., R. 223:2 (requesting earliest possible date); 225:3-4 (reiterating 
that the defense has requested that the matter be dealt with "as quickly as we could" and 
at the "soonest" date); 227:2-3 (court stating it would reset matter "as quickly as 
possible"; and defendant asking for a date "as soon as is possible"); 228:2 (invoking right 
to have case tried within 30 days); 79-83). 
In addition, Walker personally requested an immediate setting for trial (R. 227:3), 
and his counsel invoked the 30-day rule in pre-trial proceedings immediately following 
the bind-over at the preliminary hearing. (See R. 228:2). When the trial court then set 
the trial for August 2, counsel stated, "Well, let's see. I think we're entitled to 30 days, 
aren't we?" (R. 228:2). At that point, the court clerk suggested a trial for May 16, and 
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defense counsel agreed to that timing. (R. 228:2). However, the trial court then continued 
the matter to June 6, 2005, and defense counsel again objected asserting defendant's 
rights under § 77-1-6. (See R. 79-83; 229:8-13). Thus, on this record, the third factor 
weighs in favor of dismissal where Walker's rights to a speedy trial were violated. 
Under the fourth factor, this Court will consider whether the defendant was 
prejudiced by the delay. See_ HoyU 806 P.2d at 208. The prejudice analysis in this 
context assesses the "interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to 
protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial 
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the 
possibility that the defense will be impaired." Banner, 111 P.2d at 1330 (citing Barker, 
407 U.S. at 532); see also Snyder, 932 P.2d at 130 (cite omitted); State v. Miller, 141 
P.2d 440, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In this case, Walker was sent to prison for alleged parole violations based on the 
charges in this case. (See R. 229:11). He advised the trial court that in order to get a 
hearing with the board, the charges here would have to be adjudicated. (R. 227:3). He 
asked the court to resolve the case with a trial "as soon as is possible." (Id.) Thus, while 
Walker had his parole revoked due to the filing of the charges in this case, an immediate 
resolution would have been relevant to his opportunity for a hearing with the parole board 
and possible parole. Based on the record here, the unresolved charges contributed to 
oppressive pretrial incarceration. 
Moreover, so long as the charges remained unresolved, Walker was anxious and 
concerned. This Court has recognized that complaints for an immediate resolution are 
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tied closely to the anxiety and concern that a defendant feels in a case: "The more serious 
the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain." Miller, 141 P.2d at 444 
(citing State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 631-32 (Utah 1987) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 
531)). In this case, Walker and his attorney repeatedly requested immediate resolution 
(see, e.g., R. 223:2 (requesting earliest possible date); 225:3-4 (reiterating that the 
defense has requested that the matter be dealt with "as quickly as we could" and at the 
"soonest" date); 227:2-3 (court stating it would reset matter "as quickly as possible"; and 
defendant asking for a date "as soon as is possible"); 228:2 (invoking right to have case 
tried within 30 days); 79-83), thereby supporting Walker's anxiety and concern. That 
supports prejudice. Snyder, 932 P.2d at 130 (identifying prejudice concerns). 
Finally, Walker's defense was impaired by the delay. Specifically, Walker 
maintained in his defense that - although he had a prior conviction for a "[m]eth lab" 
violation, knew the recipe for methamphetamine, and used methamphetamine (see R. 
230:33-34, 41, 60) - in November 2004, he did not possess equipment or supplies for a 
clandestine lab, and he did not possess precursor. (See R. 230:40, 48-49, 66-68, 69; see 
also R. 230:37, 40, 51 (stating Austin asked about the recipe "and [he] told her")). 
Walker maintained that he did not go to Buffy Webber's apartment for a methampheta-
mine lab; rather, he went to her apartment to collect money and to help her with 
furnishings. (R. 230:35, 37-38, 40). While he was at the apartment, he helped clean, and 
he noticed a hose around the shower curtain and "glass tubing hooked up to that." (R. 
230:38-39; see also R. 230:47, 49). He assumed the hose was used "to make meth" (R. 
230:39), and he pulled it from the shower and told Webber to get rid of it. (R. 230:39, 
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47-48, 50-51, 58). Walker specified he had no involvement in a methamphetamine lab at 
the apartment. (See, e.g., R. 230:40, 43-44, 69). 
In relevant part, the State's evidence did not dispute Walker's defense. According 
to Detective Stokes, Walker knew what was going on in the apartment but he denied that 
items in the apartment were his, and he denied involvement. (R. 229:134-35). Also, 
while Walker told Stokes that his fingerprints would be on items in the apartment (R. 
229:138), Walker also explained that he helped clean the apartment and he removed the 
hose from the shower curtain. (See, e.g., R. 229:136-38, 150). According to Stokes, 
Walker answered Catherine Austin's questions about methamphetamine production (see 
R. 229:137, 152), but he did not claim to produce or cook methamphetamine in the 
apartment. (See R. 230:15-16). 
To the extent Stokes's testimony differed from Walker's, the jury would be able to 
consider the recording of the interrogation and Walker's explanation of matters. (See 
Defendant's Exhibit A; R. 230:44-51). Also, it could disregard Stokes's version of 
events since he acknowledged that his version may be "[wjrong or just. . . my view of 
the interview." (R. 230:15). 
Based on the evidence and defense, the jury could conclude that Walker used 
drugs; however, he was not at the apartment on November 17 to possess precursor or 
items for a methamphetamine lab. (R. 230:60, 69). In that regard, the jury could find 
that the evidence would not support the first degree felony as charged in this case. See, 
e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l) (proscribing possession of lab items and precursor). 
Nevertheless, in this case, the jury found Walker guilty as charged, likely due to 
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evidence from Detectives Cheshire and Carmen. They testified that they observed 
Walker place bags under the hood of the car in the engine compartment. (See R. 229:96-
97, 100-02, 109, 203, 205, 207). Also, according to Carmen, the bags contained lab 
items, including, "iodine crystals, some tubing, and some product that looked to be 
methamphetamine." (R. 229:204). 
Walker maintains that Cheshire's and Carmen's perceptions were incorrect: in 
fact, he did not handle the bags. (See R. 230:48-49, 66-67, 68). Thus, it appears that the 
delay and the passage of time affected or altered the detectives' perceptions of the events 
to the detriment of Walker's defense. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the 
process of observation and perception is affected by several factors, including the passage 
of time. It has stated, "[rjesearch demonstrates that both the length of time between the 
witness's experience and the recollection of that experience, and the occurrence of other 
events in the intervening time period, affect the accuracy and completeness of recall." 
State v. Long. Ill P.2d 483, 489 (Utah 1986); see also id. at 488 (recognizing that 
"human perception is inexact" and memory is "limited and fallible"). On this record, 
where the delay had an impact on Walker's defense, the fourth factor supports that 
Walker's right to a speedy trial was violated. Based on the four-part analysis and the 
totality of the circumstances here, this Court should reverse the trial court ruling and 
remand the case with orders to dismiss the charges.2 
2
 Utah's detainer statute also allowed a defendant to request a trial within a specific 
time period. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (2003). It required a defendant to serve 
notice on prison officials that he was requesting resolution of pending charges within 120 
days. Id. If the trial began outside the 120-day limit, this Court relied on a two-step 
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CONCLUSION 
The issue in this case may be readily resolved based on the record and established 
law. See Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). For the reasons set forth herein, Walker respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court ruling on the motion to dismiss. 
SUBMITTED this / ^ day of s f t t fy , 2008. 
Lmda M. Jones y 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
inquiry to assess the matter. See_ State v. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146, \ 8, 71 P.3d 184 
(stating court will consider (i) when the 120-day period began, and (ii) whether the trial 
court had good cause to delay the trial beyond the 120 days). A violation of the detainer 
provisions resulted in dismissal of the charges without requiring the defendant to show 
prejudice. See_ id_ at f 16. The detainer statute placed an affirmative duty on the 
prosecutor to ensure compliance with Section 77-29-1. See_ id. at ^f 11, 15. 
The Utah detainer statute is distinguishable in relevant part from Section 77-1-6 
and the four-part assessment there, which requires a prejudice showing. See_ HoyU 806 
P.2d at 208 (articulating four-part test under speedy trial analysis for § 77-l-6(l)(h)). In 
addition, the plain language of Section 77-1-6 appears to place the burden on the trial 
court to ensure that a case is resolved in a timely manner. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-
6(l)(h). 
In 2007, the legislature repealed the detainer statute. In this case, the parties and 
the trial court did not rely on or look to any part of the detainer statute in connection with 
Walker's motion to dismiss. (See R. 79-83; 229:8-13). Thus, it is inapplicable. See, e.g., 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 423 n. 7 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that a claim for a 
timely/speedy trial may be made under different provisions, and relying only on the 
provision raised in trial court proceedings). 
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I, Linda M. Jones, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered an 
original and 7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and 4 copies to the Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this 1 ^ day of Cfulv/ , 2008. 
LINDA M. JONES 
DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of 
Appeals as indicated above this day of ^U \\j , 2008. 
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SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051903660 FS 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Date: August 26, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: melbar 
Reporter: WARNICK, SUZANNE 
Prosecutor: COPE, JAMES M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 4, 1963 
Video 
CHARGES 
1. POSSESSION OF CLANDESTINE LAB EQUIP/SUPP - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/26/2005 Guilty 
2. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/26/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF CLANDESTINE 
LAB EQUIP/SUPP a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
Page 1 
Case No: 051903660 
Date: Aug 26, 2005 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Counts 1 & 2 are to be served concurrently. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 






















The State is ordered to pay the costs of preparing transcripts, as 
stated on the record. Defendant's counsel is to provide the 
information necessary to obtain transcripts. Defendant shall have 
10 days after receipt of transcripts to file the motion. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 10 (2008) 
RULE 10. ARRAIGNMENT 
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the records from the magistrate 
following a bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court. 
Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist of reading the indictment or 
information to the defendant or stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on him to 
plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or information before he is called upon 
to plead. 
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional time in which to plead or otherwise 
respond, a reasonable time may be granted. 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any proceeding provided for by statute or 
these rules prior to arraignment shall be specifically and expressly objected to before a plea of 
guilty is entered or the same is waived. 
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own recognizance, prior to arraignment 
and thereafter fails to appear for arraignment or trial when required to do so, a warrant of arrest 
may issue and bail may be forfeited. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2003) 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(0 To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the 
offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial 
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court 
permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the 
costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against 
his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or 
no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Edward Walker, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER 
Case No. 20060949-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme: 
This matter is before the court on the State's amended 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The State asserts 
that defendant's notice of appeal was untimely, thus depriving 
this court of jurisdiction. 
After the imposition of sentence on August 26, 2 005, 
defendant requested and received certain extensions of time in 
which to file a motion for new trial, extending the time until 
February 20, 2006 to file his motion. Because February 20 was a 
holiday, the motion was not due until February 21, 2006. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a). The question presented is whether 
defendant's motion was timely filed. 
A notice of appeal generally must be filed within thirty 
days of the entry of the order or judgment appealed. See Utah R. 
App. P. 4(a). Certain post-judgment motions toll the time for 
appeal, however, if made timely. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b) . A 
timely motion for a new trial pursuant to rule 2 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure will toll the time for appeal, and 
instead the appeal timej will run from the entry of the order 
denying a new trial, if See id. However, untimely motions do not 
toll the appeal time. See id. Under rule 24, a motion for new 
trial must be made within ten days "after imposition of sentence, 
or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-
day period." Utah f^Crim. P. 24(c). 
! 
There is a dispuite^as ^ to whether defendant's motion was 
timely filed. The trial court docket reflects that defendant's 
counsel filed a supporting affidavit on February 21, but that the 
motion for new trial and memorandum in support thereof were not 
filed until February 22. These entries are illogical and are not 
supported by any documents of record. Moreover, they contradict 
the sworn testimony of defense counsel, who avers that all three 
documents were timely filed on February 21. Because we are not 
bound by docket notations, see, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Griffin, 
750 P.2d 194, 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam), we hold that 
the notice of appeal was timely filed. 
The State also argues that if this court does have 
jurisdiction, the scope of this appeal should not include the 
district court's refusal to grant a new trial, because appellant 
filed his notice of appeal before the final order was entered on 
the motion for new trial. We agree. Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(b)(2) states: 
A notice of appeal filed after announcement 
or entry of judgment, but before entry of an 
order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 
4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry 
of the order and on the day thereof, except 
that such a notice of appeal is effective to 
appeal only from the underlying judgment. To 
appeal from a final order disposing of any 
motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file 
a notice of appeal or an amended notice of 
appeal within the prescribed time measured 
from the entry of the order. 
Because defendant did not file a timely notice of appeal or 
amended notice of appeal from the final order denying his motion 
for new trial, the scope of this appeal shall not include the 
denial of the motion for new trial. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the amended motion to dismiss is 
denied. *" * 
Dated this IP 1 -day of April, 2007. 
FOR THE COURT: 
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